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K.: Bankruptcy--Failure to Keep Records as Grounds for Denial of Disc
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
BANKRUPTCY - FAILURE TO I(KEP RECORDS AS GROUNDS FOR
DENIAL Or DISCHARGE. - P appeals from an order granting a dis-

charge in bankruptcy to D, a traveling salesman, on the ground
that D had failed to keep or preserve books of account or records.
Held, that D, who worked for another upon monthly commissions,
was justified in not keeping books or preserving bank statements
and cancelled checks after he examined them. Baily v. Ballance.'
The bankruptcy act, as most recently amended, provides: "The
court shall grant the discharge unless satisfied that the bankrupt
has ... (2) destroyed, mutilated, falsified, concealed, or failed to
keep or preserve books of account or records, from which his
financial condition and business transactions might be ascertained,
unless the court deems such acts or failure to have been justified
under all the circumstances of the case; . . ."I The present act
represents a restriction on the granting of discharges in that proof
of failure to keep records "with intent to conceal" financial condition is no longer required to be proved to sustain an objection
to the granting of the discharge.' Nor is it now required that
failure to keep records should have been "in contemplation of
bankruptcy" in order to deny a discharge. 4 Yet it may be noted
that the bankrupt may now justify his absence of records by
mitigating circumstances.
The bankruptcy court is lodged with reasonably wide discretion in respect to denying a discharge for failure to keep books.'
The ordinary rule that the discharge is denied where the bankrupt
has not kept books of record is thus softened by this discretionary
power of the court which will not demand that they be kept where
a normal person under like circumstances would not have kept
them.' The nature and not the size of the bankrupt's enterprise is
the principal yardstick for the necessity of keeping books and
records.7 The failure of a traveling salesman to keep books was
justified in two similar cases" on the ground that the occupation
1123 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 4th, 1941).
- 52 STAT. 850, 11 U. S. C. A. § 32 (e 2) (1938).
3 Bankruptcy act as amended, 44 SrAT. 663, c. 406, § 6 (1926); 1 COLLIER,
BANKRUPToY (14th ed. 1940) 1325; Nix v. Sternberg, 38 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A.
8th, 1930).
4 Bankruptcy act as amended, 32 STAT. 797, c. 487, § 4 (1903).
5 Hultman v. Tevis, 82 F. (2d) 940 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936); In re Wilson, 19 F.
Supp. 807 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); Rosenberg v. Bloom, 99 F. (2d) 249 (C. C. A.
9th, 1938).
aIn re Weismann, 1 F. Supp. 723 (S.D. N. Y. 1932).
7In re Popik, 18 P. Supp. 717 (E. D. N. Y. 1937).
8 In re Neiderheiser, 45 F. (2d) 489 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930) ; In re Earl, 45 F.
(2d) 492 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
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was such that the bankrupt, who was not accustomed to keeping
books, could not ordinarily be expected to keep them in view of
the fact that he was working for another and was receiving a comparatively small salary. Similarly, failure to keep books was held
to be justified for a country butcher 9, a plumber engaged in a
small enterprise 0 , a priest", a building contractor operating on
a small scale' 2 , and an employee who worked for another.1'
Further liberty exists in the form in which records may be
kept. No particular form of accounting is required, and the fact
that the bankrupt has used a crude or careless method of keeping
books is not, alone, sufficient to deny the discharge. 4
The section of the act involved in the instant case being for
the protection of creditors, it does not seem improper to make the
privilege of a discharge dependent upon reasonable care of the
bankrupt in preserving and presenting sufficient records to enable
creditors to ascertain the true status of the bankrupt's affairs. 5
The burden of proving justification of the failure to present records
rests upon the bankrupt', and it is probably true that the salesman in the principal case could well justify his failure to keep
books of record because of the nature of his business. But in view
of the fact that books of record must be kept for a reasonable time
17
when the nature of the business demands their preservation , it
is submitted that the court should have considered more fully the
fact that the bankrupt destroyed his bank statements and cancelled checks after he had examined them. Although this fact alone
might not be enough to deny a discharge, it is worthy of judicial
consideration. It is not an unreasonable man who keeps his cancelled
checks for a reasonable time after their return to him. Failure to
do so might, in some cases, be significant of an attempt to destroy
evidence of a "nest egg" set aside by payment of checks to another
9 Thompson v. Lamb, 263 Fed. 61 (C.0. A. 3d, 1920).
20 In re Hatch, 43 F. (2d) 463 (D. Maine, 1930).
11 Inre Opava, 235 Fed. 779 (N. D. Iowa, 1916).
22 In re Arnold, 228 Fed. 75 (D. N. J. 1915).
2 In re McCrea, 161 Fed. 246 (C.0. A. 2d, 1908).
14 In re Weiner, 28 F. (2d) 881 (D. Md. 1928) ; In re Russell, 52 (2d) 749
(D. N. H. 1931).
125"The purpose and intent of section 14b of the Bankruptcy Act [now section 14c (2)] is to make the privilege of discharge dependent on a true presentation of the debtor's financial affairs. It was never intended that a bankrupt, after failure, should be excused from his indebtedness without showing
an honest effort to reflect his entire business and not a part merely." In re
Underhill, 82 F. (2d) 258, 260 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936) ; Koufman v. Sheinwald, 83
F. (2d) 977 (C.C.A. 1st, 1936).
L In re Miller, 5 F. Supp. 913 (D.Md. 1934).
- In re Marino, 20 F. Supp. 741 (E. D. N. Y. 1937).
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person against the day of an anticipated bankruptcy. While the
principal case is probably sound on its facts and in its result, it
nevertheless suggests the possibility of a transfer in fraud of
creditors by immediate destruction of cancelled checks when they
are the only available record in cases where production of other
more formal records is not required of the bankrupt.
M. S. K.
BiLs -AND Nonre-DmOHAReE-REACQUISITION BEF'ORE M. AKER. - D, comaker with P, of a

TURITY BY ACCOMMODATION

note for the latter's benefit, purchased it before maturity from the
holder, and after maturity, exercised the confession of judgment
provision in the note to obtain an Ohio judgment against P. D now
brings action against P in West Virginia on the judgment, and P
seeks to enjoin the prosecution of the action. Held, that a state is
required to give full faith and credit to judgments recovered in a
sister state only if such judgment is valid; and that a judgment
rendered by a court of a sister state is not valid unless the court
had jurisdiction; and that a judgment note confers jurisdiction of
the person on the court only so long as the note remains a legal and
subsisting obligation; and that the possession of a note by the
accommodation maker at maturity in his own right was a discharge
of the note, and so the note conferred no jurisdiction on the Ohio
court. Perkins v. HaU.'
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, "A negotiable instrument is discharged: . .. (5) When the principal debtor becomes
the holder of the instrument at or after maturity in his own right. "-'
Two problems immediately present themselves in the instant case.
Is an accommodation maker a principal debtor under the act?'
Did this accommodation maker become the holder of the instrument
at or after maturity? The term principal detor is not defined by
the act, though the person primarily liable is defined as the one
who is by the terms of the instrument absolutely required to pay
117 S. E. (2d) 795 (W. Va. 1941).

2NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 119; Omo GEN. CODE (Page, 1938)
§8224; as amended, W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 46, art. 8, § 1.
3 West Virginia has eliminated this question by substituting the term "person primarily liable" for "principal debtor". An accommodation maker is
absolutely required to pay a note, and is clearly a primary party as defined by
the act. W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie,'1937) c. 46, art, 8, § 1. Accord: Marshall
County Bank v. Fonner, 113 W. Va. 451, 168 S. E. 375 (1933); Rouse v.
Wooten, 140 N. C. 557, 53 S. E. 430 (1906).
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